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Regulatory institutional distance and MNCs’ subsidiary performance: 
climbing up vs. climbing down the institutional ladder 
 
Abstract 
We investigate the possibility of regulatory institutional distance exerting an asymmetric 
effect on multinational corporations’ (MNCs’) subsidiary performance depending on the 
direction of institutional distance. We use the term ‘institutional ladder’ to differentiate 
between upward distance, referred to as when the subsidiary is operating in a relatively 
stronger institutional environment than its parent-firm’s home country, and downward 
distance for vice versa. Combining institutional theory with organisational imprinting and 
learning perspectives, we argue that the implications of regulatory institutional distance on 
subsidiary performance are relatively more positive (or less negative) when MNCs are 
climbing down the institutional ladder as compared to when MNCs are climbing up the 
institutional ladder. We also argue that subsidiary ownership strategy – i.e. the choice of a 
wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) versus joint venture (JV) – moderates the above-mentioned 
implications of institutional distance on subsidiary performance. We test these hypotheses 
based on a panel data-set of 1936 foreign subsidiaries representing 70 host countries and 66 
home countries and spanning the 12-year period: 2002 – 2013.  
 
Keywords: Institutional Distance, Subsidiary Performance, Institutional Theory, 
Organisational Imprinting  
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1. Introduction 
 Institutional distance, defined as cross-country differences in the ‘regulatory, 
normative and cognitive’ aspects of Multinational Corporations’ (MNCs’) home and host 
countries (Scott, 1995) is regarded as an important factor determining various decisions of 
MNCs such as their entry mode, ownership and staffing in host countries, and in subsequently 
having an effect on the performance of foreign subsidiaries (Ambos and Håkanson, 2014; 
Brouthers, 2002; Chao and Kumar, 2010; Dikova, 2009; Gaur et al., 2007; Gaur and Lu, 
2007; Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997). On the one hand, literature on the ‘liabilities of 
foreignness’ predominantly suggests that at higher levels of institutional distance, MNCs’ 
subsidiaries experience greater uncertainty about the host environment and have to bear 
greater costs of learning and adapting to the host-country’s ‘rules of the game’, leading to 
declining competitive advantages at the subsidiary level (Shirodkar and Konara, 2016). On 
the other hand, it is argued that as institutional distance increases, MNCs can benefit from 
greater opportunities for arbitrage (e.g. first-mover advantages, research and development 
advantages), improving the competitive advantages available to foreign subsidiaries (Dikova, 
2009). In the light of this paradox about the implications of institutional distance, some 
studies have also found evidence of an inverted-U shaped relationship between institutional 
distance and subsidiary performance (e.g. Gaur and Lu, 2007). 
 We suggest that a crucial gap in research on the implications of institutional distance 
has been the arguably ‘symmetric’ treatment of institutional distance, i.e. most prior studies 
on the relationship between institutional distance and subsidiary performance have focused 
only on the magnitude of institutional distance and have ignored the issue of ‘direction’ of 
institutional distance. The issue of direction has only been recognised in a few recent studies 
(Chikhouni et al., 2017; Contractor et al., 2016; Hernández and Nieto, 2015; Trąpczyński and 
Banalieva, 2016). Contractor et al (2016), for instance, examine the moderating effect of the 
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direction of various distance-dimensions on the link between MNCs’ intangible assets and 
subsidiary profitability. Therefore, in this paper we aim to resolve the aforementioned 
paradox on the institutional distance – subsidiary performance relationship by accounting for 
the directionality of institutional distance. To simplify things, we use the term institutional 
ladder i.e. when MNCs establish subsidiaries in host countries that are institutionally weaker 
than their home country, then, we suggest that they are moving in a downward direction on 
the institutional ladder (i.e. from a stronger to a weaker institutional environment). In contrast, 
when MNCs establish subsidiaries in host countries that are institutionally stronger than their 
home country, then, we suggest that they are moving in an upward direction on the 
institutional ladder (i.e. from a weaker to a stronger institutional environment)1. We propose 
that the level of benefits of institutional arbitrage vs. the costs of adaptation - as suggested 
earlier, will depend not only on the magnitude of distance but also on the direction – i.e. 
whether MNCs are climbing up or down the institutional ladder. Further, we also argue that 
subsidiary ownership strategies – i.e. the choice of a wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) versus 
joint venture (JV) moderates this relationship.  
 Although institutions comprise of regulatory, cognitive and normative pillars (Scott, 
1995), we focus only on ‘regulatory’ (i.e. formal) institutional distance. This is because, first, 
regulative factors are coercive and therefore cannot be taken for granted by MNCs. At the 
same time, change in regulative institutions has been argued to be more frequent and rather 
rapid as compared to change in normative and cognitive factors (e.g. changes in culture) 
(Estrin et al., 2009). Therefore, a large number of studies have highlighted the relatively 
                                                          
1 Hernandez and Nieto (2015) and Trąpczyński & Banalieva (2016) have used a similar notion of the 
two directions of distance, however, they use the terms positive and negative distance. This 
terminology can be confusing as it may imply that former direction is better than the latter, thus we 
prefer upward and downward terms instead.  
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greater importance of regulatory differences to MNCs in comparison to normative and 
cognitive factors (Chao and Kumar, 2010; Eden and Miller, 2004; Jackson and Deeg, 2008; 
Roth and Kostova, 2003; Yiu and Makino, 2002). Second, scholars have argued that 
focussing on all three pillars of institutional distance rather provides a broad basis for 
analysis, thus leading to oversimplification (Zaheer et al., 2012). In the light of the above, our 
key research questions are– (1) To what extent does the direction of regulatory institutional 
distance affect MNCs’ subsidiary performance? and (2) To what extent does subsidiary 
ownership strategy moderate the relationship between institutional distance and subsidiary 
performance? 
 We aim to contribute to existing literature in the following ways. First, by accounting 
for the direction (in addition to the magnitude) of the effect of regulatory institutional distance 
on subsidiary performance, we contribute to the on-going debate on this relationship to 
resolve this paradox. We suggest that the arbitrage opportunities and adaptation costs to 
MNCs dealing with institutional distance vary according to the direction, and can thus have 
varying implications on subsidiaries’ performance. To explain this, we use new theoretical 
insights – such as the organisational imprinting argument in combination with institutional 
and learning theories. The organisational imprinting argument (Stinchcombe, 1965) posits 
that conditions in the external environment surrounding firms ‘get stamped’ onto 
organisational behaviour, and that these characteristics persist even in the face of subsequent 
environmental changes. In our context, we suggest that common regulatory conditions faced 
by MNCs in their ‘home’ environments – e.g. levels of corruption, rule of law, enforcement 
of local regulations, government effectiveness, may create similar perceptions of opportunity 
or risk among firms founded in these environments. This subsequently has a lasting effect on 
the capabilities developed by MNCs to deal with their home institutions, and are likely to be 
transferred to subsidiary levels in host countries (Holburn and Zelner, 2010). We suggest that 
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in institutionally distant environments, the imprinting effects of home regulatory institutions 
can have two different implications on subsidiary performance: (1) Subsidiaries can benefit 
from arbitraging the imprinting effects of ‘home-institutions’ in addition to the opportunities 
provided by ‘host institutions’ (Gaur and Lu, 2007) (hereafter institutional arbitrage); and (2) 
Subsidiaries have to bear the costs incurred in not only ‘learning’ about host-institutions 
(Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998) but also in ‘unlearning’ the imprinting effects of home-
institutions (Markoczy, 1994; Tsang and Zahra, 2008) (hereafter institutional adaptation). 
Recent studies in this context have argued that unlearning could be fundamentally different 
from learning (Tsang, 2008) and that unlearning involves separate processes of ‘disorganising 
knowledge by breaking routines, changing structures and managing cultures in ways that 
dismantle deeply embedded knowledge’ (de Holan et al., 2004). In the later sections we argue 
that the level of benefits of institutional arbitrage vs. the costs of adaptation will depend on 
the direction as well as the magnitude of institutional distance, potentially resulting in varying 
effects on subsidiary performance.  
 Second, by including a large number of home and host countries in our empirical 
analysis, we also contribute to the findings of recent studies on this issue that are limited to 
MNCs originating from a single home-country (i.e. Poland) (Trąpczyński and Banalieva, 
2016).  Recent research highlights that by focusing on a single home-country, the validity of 
the institutional distance construct can be undermined due to a greater conflation between 
‘institutional distance’ and ‘institutional profile effects’ (Van Hoorn and Maseland, 2016), 
where ‘institutional profile’ relates to the institutional environment of a particular home or 
host country where firms are deeply embedded and face distinct opportunities and challenges 
(Meyer et al., 2009). We test our hypotheses by analysing the performance of 1936 MNC-
subsidiaries over the 12-year period: 2002 – 2013, representing 70 host countries and 66 
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home countries, and this allows us to rigorously contribute to this discussion using firm-level 
data from a wide variety of home and host countries.  
 Finally, we also examine the complex effects of the choice of ownership strategies 
(i.e. partial vs. full-ownership of the subsidiary) in benefiting from arbitrage opportunities and 
in mitigating the costs of adapting to institutional differences while climbing up and down the 
ladder. The choice of ownership strategies has been considered as one of the key determinants 
of foreign subsidiary performance (Zhao et al., 2017). Prior studies have also examined the 
moderating effect of ownership strategy on the institutional distance – subsidiary performance 
relationship. In this context, generally, full subsidiary ownership has been argued to enhance 
existing positive effects of institutional distance (Dikova, 2009), and to mitigate the 
potentially negative implications of institutional distance on subsidiary performance (Gaur 
and Lu, 2007). On the other hand, within emerging markets specifically, partial subsidiary 
ownership has been found to reduce the negative effects of institutional distance on subsidiary 
performance (Shirodkar and Konara, 2016). In this context we contribute to these ongoing 
discussions by examining the moderating effect of ownership strategy on the climbing up vs 
down the institutional ladder – subsidiary performance relationship.  
 The rest of our paper is organised as follows. First we formulate our hypotheses on the 
relationship between the magnitude and direction of institutional distance and performance of 
MNCs’ subsidiaries. We then describe our data and present our findings. Finally, we discuss 
our results, and conclude our paper by highlighting our contributions, limitations and 
suggesting worthwhile avenues for future research. 
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2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
2.1 Institutional arbitrage and adaptation: Towards a directional effect 
 Scholars have argued that institutional differences between MNCs’ home and host 
countries provide arbitrage opportunities for MNCs (Gaur and Lu, 2007; Jackson and Deeg, 
2008; Mallon and Fainshmidt, 2017). Such opportunities may arise in two ways (1) From the 
‘imprinting’ effect of the MNC’s ‘home’ regulatory environment where the MNC may be 
deeply embedded, and (2) Due to supportive ‘host’ country regulatory environments where 
MNCs may seek to ‘escape’ from certain constraints posed by its home institutions. In the 
former (i.e. imprinting) case, firm-level capabilities and knowledge imprinted within firms 
from stronger ‘home institutions’ can be advantageous to their foreign subsidiaries (Cuervo-
Cazurra and Genc, 2008). For instance, developed countries with stronger home-institutions 
encourage their firms to develop more sophisticated capabilities, such as by encouraging their 
firms to innovate. When these institutionally imprinted capabilities are transferred to 
subsidiary levels, these form an important basis of their subsidiaries’ competitiveness, 
particularly for subsidiaries in institutionally weaker countries, where local firms may lack 
innovative products and superior management techniques (Luo and Peng, 1999; Mallon and 
Fainshmidt, 2017). Likewise, in the latter (i.e. escape) case, stronger host institutions relative 
to the MNC’s home country also provide escape-based arbitrage advantages. For instance, 
MNCs from weaker institutional settings often set up research and development (R&D) 
centres in developed countries (such as the United States) due to better institutional support 
for protecting innovative technologies (Gaur and Lu, 2007). Thus, in either direction, MNCs 
can benefit from arbitrage opportunities as institutional distance increases. 
 Despite the potential benefits from arbitrage, as institutional differences increase, this 
would also result in increasing adaptation costs for MNCs’ subsidiaries (Kostova and Roth, 
2002; Kostova et al., 2008). These costs could, again, be two-fold: (1) from an imprinting 
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perspective, greater regulatory institutional distance increases pressures on ‘unlearning’ (de 
Holan et al., 2004; Markoczy, 1994; Tsang and Zahra, 2008) deeply embedded political and 
social knowledge that could be part of the MNC’s competitive advantage in its home country; 
and (2) from a ‘learning’ perspective, greater distance increases the pressure on acquiring 
knowledge of the new local rules of the game of the host country.  
 Thus, institutional distance can be argued to have two different implications on 
subsidiary performance. First, as institutional distance increases, MNCs can ‘arbitrage’ from 
the knowledge embedded due to home-imprinting effects, and the favourable regulations 
available in the host country. Second, with greater distance, MNCs’ subsidiaries need to bear 
the costs of ‘adapting’ by not only learning about the host environment but also by unlearning 
certain aspects of the knowledge imprinted within the MNC from its home environment. In 
the following sections we argue that these implications of institutional distance, i.e. level of 
potential benefits of arbitrage and the costs of adapting, may vary depending on the direction 
of institutional distance. This direction-based approach of dealing with institutional distance 
enables us to clearly identify the channels in which dissimilarity can affect subsidiary 
performance while recognising that the home-institutions are embedded in the firm (or the 
MNC) and host-institutions are largely embedded in the operating environment of the 
subsidiary. 
2.1.1 Extent of arbitrage advantages: Climbing up vs climbing down the institutional ladder 
 Greater institutional distance when ‘climbing down’ the institutional ladder enables 
MNCs to gain from several arbitrage advantages. The first advantage, as suggested 
previously, is associated with imprinting. Well-developed home-institutions place an 
emphasis on its firms to develop stronger R&D capabilities to produce innovative products, 
achieve better production efficiencies, and to adopt more effective marketing and 
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management processes that enhance firms’ competitive advantages (Kriauciunas and Kale, 
2006). Also, stronger home-institutions encourage its firms to develop more sophisticated 
non-market capabilities – i.e. capabilities to interact and negotiate policy terms with 
governments; whereas the lack of such mechanisms in weakly institutionalised countries leads 
its firms to use bribery and connections that may incur reputational risks to firms (Campos 
and Giovannoni, 2007). In line with imprinting theory, when operating in a focal host country, 
subsidiaries of MNCs from stronger home-institutions are imprinted with such better market-
based and non-market capabilities, and the transfer of these capabilities to the host-subsidiary 
provides subsidiaries with advantages when competing with subsidiaries of MNCs originating 
from weaker home-institutional countries. Therefore, with greater institutional distance in the 
downward direction, subsidiaries can benefit from a greater positive home-imprinting effect.  
 In the opposite direction of MNCs ‘climbing up’ the institutional ladder, as distance 
increases, we argue that the opportunities in arbitraging the imprinting effects of their ‘home 
environments’ are fewer.  This is because, weak home institutions are inefficient in providing 
the necessary resources and infrastructure to support firms to develop high-tech innovative 
products (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2011). Also, weak home-institutions provide weak bases 
for its firms to nurture external financial, organizational and technological resources needed to 
compete internationally (Gillespie and Teegen, 1996). As such, with greater distance when 
going up the institutional ladder, the imprinting effects of home-institutions reduce the 
competitive advantages that are transmitted to subsidiary levels from their MNCs’ home-
countries. Therefore, in terms of exploiting arbitrage advantages associated with the 
imprinting effect, with greater distance in the upward direction, subsidiaries of MNCs 
experience a greater degree of competitive disadvantage in comparison to subsidiaries of 
MNCs going in the downward direction. 
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 The second set of arbitrage advantages are associated with ‘escape’, however, we 
suggest that the institutional distance is less likely to have an effect on performance at the 
subsidiary level. E.g. in the case of ‘climbing down’, MNCs in pollution-intensive industries 
often co-locate their production activities in emerging economies with weaker environmental 
protection regulations in order to reduce pollution abatement costs (Eskeland and Harrison, 
2003). Likewise, in the case of ‘climbing up’ the ladder  MNCs from emerging markets often 
invest in developed countries to be able to ‘catchup’ on latest technologies that are needed to 
compete in a global environment (Athreye and Cantwell, 2007; Luo and Tung, 2007). 
However, such escape-related opportunities are equally available to all subsidiaries (of all 
MNCs) in the host country (regardless of distance). Also, the performance advantages of 
escape are more likely to be realised at an MNC or other subsidiary levels (e.g. via knowledge 
transfer) rather than at the focal-subsidiary level. Thus, in sum, we suggest that the extent of 
arbitrage opportunities (related to imprinting) available for MNCs that could affect subsidiary 
performance is considerably higher when MNCs are climbing down the institutional ladder 
compared to when MNCs are climbing up the institutional ladder.  
2.1.2 Extent of adaptation costs: Climbing up vs climbing down the institutional ladder 
 Greater institutional distance when ‘climbing down’ the institutional ladder increases 
adaptation (i.e. learning + unlearning) costs. ‘Learning’ costs involve acquiring local 
knowledge to deal with information asymmetries and institutional voids, e.g. gaining reliable 
market-research information (Chacar and Vissa, 2005) and managing perceptions of 
stakeholders who may perceive MNCs from stronger home-institutional countries as 
exploitative towards the host countries’ local resources (Child and Tsai, 2005). However, we 
suggest that, even though ‘learning’ costs increase in the downward direction, the costs 
associated with ‘unlearning’ reduce. This is because, in this direction MNCs bring in 
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advanced technologies and superior management techniques to host countries, and external 
stakeholders in developing host countries are less likely to expect MNCs to ‘unlearn’ these 
capabilities (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2011). On the contrary, to compete with MNCs from 
stronger institutions, greater unlearning is expected on part of subsidiaries of MNCs from 
lesser distant (i.e. relatively weaker) home-institutions, who are expected to upgrade their 
market-based and nonmarket capabilities. For example, in China, since the 1990s, an 
increasing number of local and foreign firms have been moving away from relational 
mechanisms of doing business towards arms-length transactional mechanisms (Luo, 1997; 
Peng and Luo, 2000). Therefore, when climbing down the institutional ladder, whereas 
subsidiaries from lesser distant (i.e. weaker) home-institutional settings must bear a greater 
level of adaptation costs of both learning and unlearning, subsidiaries of firms from more 
distant (i.e. stronger) home-institutions must only learn to adapt (with little unlearning). 
 In the reverse direction, i.e.  when ‘climbing up’ the institutional ladder, we suggest 
that the extent of adaptation costs is higher. MNCs from weakly institutionalised (or 
emerging) countries are embedded in regulatory frameworks that are characterised by 
information asymmetry, higher levels of corruption, political instability and ineffective 
enforcement of local regulations. Consequently, MNCs based in these contexts develop 
specific nonmarket capabilities (such as through political or family connections) to operate in 
the absence of legitimate mechanisms of business-government interface (Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Genc, 2011). On the contrary, host countries with stronger institutions offer formal and more 
legitimate mechanisms to gain non-market support. When climbing up the institutional ladder, 
with greater distance, the imprinting effect of organisational practices (Kriauciunas and Kale, 
2006) increases the pressure on MNCs’ subsidiaries to ‘unlearn’ their home-based practices 
(e.g. the practice of relying on connections), in addition to bearing the costs of ‘learning’ the 
local (and arguably more legitimate) rules of the game. Therefore, we expect that MNCs 
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climbing up the institutional ladder must bear a greater level of adaptation costs in terms of 
both learning and unlearning in relation to MNCs climbing down the institutional ladder.  
2.1.3 The asymmetric effect of institutional distance: climbing down vs. climbing up the 
institutional ladder 
 As suggested above, the implications of institutional distance, i.e. level of potential 
benefits of arbitrage and the costs of adapting, vary depending on the direction of institutional 
distance. In comparison to MNCs climbing up the institutional ladder, MNEs climbing down 
the institutional ladder can benefit from a much greater level of positive imprinting-based 
arbitrage advantages. Therefore, in terms of (1) ‘arbitrage opportunities’, performance 
implications of institutional distance are relatively more positive in the downward direction 
than in the upward direction. At the same time, in relation to MNCs climbing down the 
institutional ladder, MNCs climbing up the institutional ladder must bear a greater level of 
adaptation costs in terms of both learning and unlearning. Therefore, in terms of (2) 
‘adaptation costs’, performance implications of institutional distance are also relatively more 
positive in the downward direction than in the upward direction. Thus, the effect of arbitrage 
advantages and adaptation costs that is likely to impact subsidiary performance is relatively 
more positive for MNEs climbing down the institutional ladder as compared to that for MNEs 
climbing up the institutional ladder. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, the performance implications of regulatory institutional 
distance on subsidiary performance are relatively more positive (or less negative) when 
MNCs are climbing down the institutional ladder as compared to when MNCs are climbing 
up the institutional ladder.  
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2.2 Moderating effect of subsidiary ownership strategy 
 Notwithstanding the effects of institutional distance, subsidiary ownership strategy has 
been argued as an important mechanism by which MNCs can gain further from arbitrage 
benefits and mitigate the adaptation costs posed by institutional differences (Meyer et al., 
2009; Wright et al., 2005). Therefore, we next examine whether the ownership strategy (full 
ownership vs. partial ownership) can moderate the effect of the upward and downward 
institutional distance on subsidiary performance.  
 As argued previously, the extent of arbitrage advantages available for MNCs is 
relatively higher for MNCs climbing down the institutional ladder compared to those for 
MNCs climbing up the institutional ladder. We argue that with greater (or full) ownership of 
the subsidiary by the foreign parent, the positive effect of home-institutional imprinting is 
further enhanced. Full-ownership of the subsidiary allows greater control of the subsidiary 
and facilitates easier transfer of MNC-level capabilities to the subsidiary level, thus enhancing 
the imprinting effect, and allowing the subsidiary to gain from the positive imprinting-based 
arbitrage advantages to a greater extent. On the contrary, the scope of arbitraging from the 
home-institutional imprinting effect is generally reduced when the subsidiary has to operate in 
collaboration with a partner. Although it has been argued that a joint venture mode reduces an 
MNC’s liabilities of foreignness and learning costs, collaboration with a partner can also lead 
to conflicts in decision making, and the focal MNC may also fear the risk of misappropriation 
by the partner when transferring its valuable resources and capabilities at the subsidiary level 
(Contractor et al., 2016; Gaur and Lu, 2007). Therefore, in terms of capitalising arbitrage 
opportunities, the benefits of full ownership are much greater for MNCs climbing down the 
institutional ladder as compared to MNCs climbing up the institutional ladder, as the extent of 
arbitrage advantages available for MNCs is considerably higher in the downward direction 
than in the upward direction. 
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 In terms of adaptation costs, we argued that MNCs climbing up the institutional ladder 
must bear a greater level of adaptation costs in terms of both learning and unlearning as 
compared to MNCs climbing down the institutional ladder. A joint venture partner can help to 
reduce the MNC’s liabilities of foreignness and learning/unlearning costs. Such learning-
based advantages of operating in collaboration are more important in the upward direction 
due to the greater level of adaptation costs. In addition to this, greater (or full) ownership of 
the subsidiary enhances the negative imprinting effect of MNCs climbing up the institutional 
ladder– leading to further deficiencies in subsidiary-level resources. In order to complement 
for these deficiencies and to reduce both learning and unlearning costs, MNCs climbing up 
the ladder may benefit more from local partners having technological and reputational 
resources and capabilities (Hitt et al., 2000). Therefore, by operating collaboratively, rather 
than by taking full ownership of the subsidiary, with greater distance climbing up the 
institutional ladder, subsidiaries of MNCs can mitigate the negative imprinting effect of weak 
home-institutions, and reduce their learning and unlearning costs in adapting to the stronger 
institutional environment. Therefore, in terms of adaptation costs, the benefits of joint 
ventures are much greater for MNCs climbing up the institutional ladder as compared to 
MNCs climbing down the institutional ladder, as the level of adaptation costs is higher for the 
former direction than the latter direction.  
 Based on the above, we suggest that subsidiary ownership strategy will have a varying 
effect on the competitive advantages of the subsidiary depending on the direction of distance. 
In this context, we expect that full ownership will be more beneficial for capitalising the 
arbitrage opportunities, and will therefore be relatively more beneficial in the downward 
direction where such opportunities are greater; and the joint ownership strategy will be more 
beneficial for mitigating learning and unlearning costs, and therefore will be relatively more 
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beneficial in the upward direction where such costs are greater. We therefore formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, full subsidiary-ownership (as opposed to partial ownership) is 
likely to be more beneficial for subsidiary performance when MNCs are climbing down the 
institutional ladder than when MNCs are climbing up the institutional ladder.  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Data collection 
 Our panel data was collected from Bureau van Dijk’s OSIRIS database, which 
provides firm-level data on listed, and major unlisted/delisted, companies around the world. 
We track the performance of 1936 firms over the 12-year period: 2002 – 2013, representing 
70 host countries and 66 home countries (see Appendix 1 for the full list of countries 
represented by this dataset). Altogether, there are 11,922 firm-year observations. 
3.2 Measures 
 We measured MNCs’ subsidiary performance by return on equity (ROE), which is our 
dependent variable. ROE has been used in a vast number of studies as a measure of firm 
performance (e.g. Klarner and Raisch, 2012; Zahra et al., 2000). In a cross country setting, 
ROE is a better performance measure compared to return on assets (ROA), as asset turnover 
depends on the market value of assets, which can vary significantly due to differences in the 
market value of assets across countries (Chan et al., 2010). Our key explanatory variable is 
the institutional distance (regulatory) between the host country of the subsidiary firm and the 
home country of the parent firm. Following Dikova (2009), we operationalized institutional 
distance based on the Worldwide Governance Indicators that are based on the work of 
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Kaufmann and colleagues (Kaufmann et al., 2007; Kaufmann et al., 1999). For each country, 
six dimensions of governance, i.e. Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of 
Corruption are reported in Worldwide Governance Indicators. Based on these six governance 
indicators, we calculated a composite variable 2  for the host country (institutional profile 
scores for the host country) by carrying out factor analysis. Similarly, we calculated a 
composite variable3 for the home country (institutional profile scores for the home country). 
We then calculated the institutional distance (ID) by subtracting the host country institutional 
profile score from the home country institutional profile score, therefore, a positive score 
represents climbing down the institutional ladder and a negative score represents climbing up 
the institutional ladder. We partitioned our composite institutional distant measure (ID) into 
an upward institutional distance variable (IDu) and a downward institutional distance variable 
(IDd) as follows: 
 IDu = |ID| if ID<0 
 IDu = 0 otherwise 
 
 IDd = |ID| if ID>0 
 IDd = 0 otherwise 
 Partitioning the institutional distant measure (ID) into two vectors is required to 
properly capture the effect of these two directions of institutional distance. IDu captures the 
distance in the upward direction (when ID<0) and this needs to take the value of zero in the 
downward direction (when ID>0) and no institutional distance (ID=0). In contrast, IDd 
captures the distance in the downward direction (when ID>0) and this needs to take the value 
of zero in the upward direction (when ID<0) and no institutional distance (ID=0). To illustrate 
                                                          
2 This composite variable accounted for 99.8% of the variance. 
3 This composite variable accounted for 98.4% of the variance. 
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further, our composite variable ID spans from -4.67 to +3.61 and our upward institutional 
distance measure IDu varies from 0 to 4.67 and the downward institutional distance measure 
IDd varies from 0 to 3.61. Employing a measure of institutional distance constructed by 
subtracting the host country institutional profile score from the home country institutional 
profile score only allows us to examine the performance implications of positive institutional 
distance compared to negative institutional distance (either test H1).  Deconstructing this 
variable into two directional variables also allows us to disentangle the two effects of upward 
distance (ID<0) and downward distance (ID>0) compared to the effect of zero institutional 
distance (ID=0). This approach allows us to examine the net effect of imprinting-based 
arbitrage advantages and the level of adaptation costs on subsidiary performance in each 
direction. 
 We measure whether a subsidiary is fully owned or partially owned by a dummy 
variable (Full ownership) that takes the value of one if the subsidiary is owned by the foreign 
owner with at least 90% stake and zero if the firm is partially owned with at least a 10% stake. 
 Guided by previous literature and empirical evidence, we included several control 
variables. To control for the effect of informal institutional (culture) distance between the host 
and the home country, we include two measures, i.e. language distance and religious distance 
between the host and the home country. Among the firm level determinants of firm 
performance, firm’s size and age are the two most widely used demographic characteristics of 
firms (Klarner and Raisch, 2012), therefore we include firm size and age. Research and 
Development (R&D) activities have long been seen as an important source for a firm’s 
sustainable competitive advantages, therefore contributing to firm performance (Delios and 
Beamish, 2001b). Therefore, we also include R&D intensity (R&D expenditure as a 
proportion of sales) as a control variable. We include the number of patents registered by the 
firm in the last 3 years as a firm’s intellectual properties can affect firm performance. Existing 
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literature shows that the board and ownership structure can have implications on firm 
performance (Barth et al., 2005; Core et al., 1999), therefore we include number of directors 
in the board and the Full ownership as control variables. At the parent level, we include the 
number of patents registered by the parent firm in the last 3 years (parent-patents), as parent 
level FSAs can affect subsidiary performance. In order to control for the product-market 
dynamics that can affect firm performance, first we include whether the firm is a diversified 
firm or not. We also control for the number of competitors (competition) in the industry. To 
control for any unobserved industry-specific effects that can affect firm profitability, industry 
fixed effects are included for a total of 77 sectors4. As market efficiency can positively affect 
business performance, we also include the Business Freedom index from Heritage Foundation 
Economic Freedom Index. We also control for host country’s GDP growth rate, GDP per 
capita, infrastructure and level of human capital as these country-level variables can affect 
firm performance. Finally, we controlled for the geographic distance between the host 
country and the home country. The sources of all variables and their measurements are 
summarized in Appendix II. 
 
4. Results  
 Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 1. We estimate our 
specification based on a random effects model (Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator) 
in a panel data framework, where we control for host country specific, home country specific, 
year specific and industry specific fixed effects. Our subsidiary level observations may not be 
statistically independent as multiple subsidiaries from the same MNC might not be 
independent. Therefore, we include a robust variance estimate that adjusts for within-cluster 
                                                          
4 Industry fixed effects are defined at the two-digit sectoral classification based on the NACE Rev 2 
classification. 
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(subsidiaries of the same parent) correlation (Williams, 2000). This controls for the possibility 
that subsidiary observations belonging to the same MNC might not be independent. 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
 Table 2 presents three sets of results based on the composite institutional distance 
variables. Model 2.1 and 2.2 reports the results with two constructs of absolute values of 
institutional variables, either ignoring the directionality of the formal institutional distance. 
AID in model 2.1 is the absolute value of our composite variable ID. MID in model 2.2 is the 
institutional distance constructed based on Mahalonobis method. This method accounts for 
variance of each dimension and co-variance between dimensions by using information in 
variance–covariance matrix and produces scale-invariant distance measures. Based on each 
year’s data, we calculate MID on a yearly basis using separate covariance matrices for each 
year.5 Mahalanobis method is an increasingly used method to construct composite distance 
variables when there is potential overlap among the component dimensions; however, it drops 
the information on the directionality of the distance in the process. In both models 2.1 and 2.2, 
formal institutional distance variable is insignificant with a large standard error. In model 2.3, 
we include our composite variable (ID) with its magnitude as well as its sign. ID varies from -
4.67 to +3.61. ID is highly significant with a positive coefficient. This indicates that 
downward institutional distance has a significant positive affect compared to upward 
institutional distance, i.e. firms climbing down the institutional ladder perform much better 
than firms climbing up the ladder, providing support for our hypothesis 1. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                          
5 Please refer to Berry, Guillén, & Zhou (2010) for the detailed methodology of calculating 
Mahalanobis distance. 
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 Next, we examine the net performance effect of each directional variable (upward 
institutional distance and downward institutional distance). We do not hypothesise the 
performance effect the two directional institutional distance variables, as this effect will 
depend on the net effect of imprinting-based arbitrage advantages and the level of adaptation 
costs in each direction. Table 3 reports the results with the directional variables. In panel 3.1, 
downward institutional distance has a positive coefficient and upward institutional distance 
has a negative coefficient and they are significant. This indicates that subsidiaries of MNCs 
that climb down the ladder (i.e. go from stronger to weaker institutional environment) 
perform relatively better and subsidiaries of MNCs that climb up the ladder (i.e. go from 
weaker to stronger institutional environment) perform relatively poorer. Our results for the 
directional variables also provide a strong support for our hypothesis 1; as downward 
institutional distance is positive and upward institutional distance is negative, we can clearly 
see that firms climbing down the institutional ladder perform much better than firms climbing 
up the ladder. We performed a t test for the above two differences, and the test results provide 
support for H1. 
 Next, we examine the moderating effect of subsidiary-ownership strategy, i.e. whether 
full subsidiary-ownership (as opposed to partial ownership) is more beneficial for subsidiary 
performance when climbing down the institutional ladder than climbing up the institutional 
ladder. We used the partition approach to differentiate the effect of institutional distance on 
subsidiary performance between fully owned vs partially owned firms. This approach 
effectively partitions the effect of an explanatory variable Y (institutional distance) on the 
dependent variable Z (subsidiary performance) for the two categories of firms (fully owned vs 
partially owned firms) by employing two multiplicative terms, that are mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive. Results are reported in panel 3.2 of table 3. Here we have partitioned the 
downward institutional distance into two mutually exclusive multiplicative terms: Full 
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ownership * Downward institutional distance and Partial ownership * Downward 
institutional distance. Similarly, upward institutional distance is partitioned into Full 
ownership * Upward institutional distance and Partial ownership * Downward institutional 
distance.  
 Downward institutional distance is positive and significant for both fully owned and 
partially owned firms. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient is higher for fully owned 
firms than for partially owned firms. However, the difference in magnitude is not very large, 
and a t test shows that the difference is not significant at a 10% level. Upward institutional 
distance is negative and significant for both fully owned and partially owned firms. The 
estimated coefficient is more negative for fully owned firms than for partially owned firms. 
Also, its significance is higher for fully owned firms (p<0.05) than for partially owned firms 
(p<0.10). However, again the difference in magnitude is not very large, and a t test shows that 
the difference is not significant at a 10% level. In order to test our H2, we performed a t test 
for the above two differences, however, the t test shows that the difference is not significant at 
a 10% level (p=0.148) although the difference in the coefficients are in the right direction as 
per H2. Therefore, our H2 is not supported.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLES 6 AND 7 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
 With regard to the effect of the control variables, our results (table 3) show that firm 
size is positively associated with subsidiary performance, reiterating the importance of 
subsidiary-level resources. One interesting observation is that the number of directors is 
negatively associated with subsidiary performance. While greater board size is indicative of 
greater diversity and has been associated with greater competitive advantage, greater reliance 
on ‘external’ (i.e. nonmarket related) board members has been associated with negative 
performance in some studies  (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). The coefficient of Diversified is 
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positive indicating that diversified firms perform better than firms that focus only on one 
sector, however, this was insignificant (p = 0.11).  As expected, the parent-patents is positive 
(but insignificant) indicating the positive effect of parent firms’ intellectual properties on 
subsidiary performance.  Interestingly, patents registered under the firm is negative (although 
not significant). This could be due to the fact that MNCs may concentrate their innovation 
activities in a particular subsidiary (competency creating subsidiaries), and such subsidiaries 
may not perform better in revenue generation and may incur a large expenditure on 
innovation activities. Competition is negative (although not significant) indicating that firms 
with larger number of competitors in the sector perform weaker. As expected, business 
freedom is positive and significant. Human capital is positive as expected, but it is not 
significant. Religious distance is associated with positive performance, supporting previous 
theory that has argued for the potential advantages of operating in culturally distant 
environments (e.g. Dikova, 2009). As expected, geographical distance between the home and 
host country is negative but insignificant (p = 0.11). Other control variables are largely 
insignificant. Therefore, our control variables perform modestly well. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 Our study was inspired by the increasing importance of asymmetry in formal 
institutional distance, and its effects on the performance of MNCs’ foreign subsidiaries. As 
the role of asymmetry in institutional distance has been gaining momentum, our study is one 
of the few recent studies to examine the effects on subsidiary-level performance. We therefore 
make an important contribution by examining how the direction along with the magnitude of 
institutional distance poses distinct opportunities and challenges to MNCs’ foreign 
subsidiaries. 
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 In this regard, first, we theoretically examine the asymmetric effect of institutional 
distance on the performance of MNCs’ foreign affiliates when climbing up vs down the 
‘institutional ladder’. Consistent with recent studies (Contractor et al., 2016; Trąpczyński and 
Banalieva, 2016) by accounting for this directionality with respect to the effect of regulative 
institutional distance on subsidiary performance, we challenge the traditional assumption that 
the effect of institutional distance on subsidiary performance is the same for a firm regardless 
of whether it operates in a country with a stronger or weaker formal institutional environment 
than its origin. We contribute to this discussion by theoretically synthesising the arguments on 
institutional arbitrage and adaptability found in the prior literature on institutional distance, 
and by integrating them with organisational imprinting (Stinchcombe, 1965) and learning 
(Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Zahra et al., 2000) and unlearning perspectives (Tsang and 
Zahra, 2008; Zahra et al., 2011). By integrating these different yet interrelated perspectives, 
we contribute by developing a robust framework to understand the effect of the direction of 
institutional distance and subsidiary performance. We argue that the extent of institutional 
arbitrage and institutional adaptation vary depending on the direction of institutional 
distance, and therefore institutional distance has an asymmetrical effect on subsidiary 
performance depending on the direction. We argue that there is considerable potential for 
institutional arbitrage due to greater positive home-imprinting effects with greater distance 
down the institutional ladder but such a potential is smaller when climbing up the ladder. We 
show that institutional adaptability is quite a challenge in both directions; however, this is 
likely to be more arduous with greater distance climbing up the ladder, due to greater 
pressures on unlearning the negative home-institutional-imprinting effects on MNCs’ 
subsidiaries. 
 Our results show that downward institutional distance has a significant positive effect 
on subsidiary performance compared to upward institutional distance, thus supporting our 
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hypothesis 1. We also empirically examine the net effect of imprinting-based arbitrage 
advantages and the level of adaptation costs on subsidiary performance in each direction. By 
doing so, we reveal that subsidiary performance improves with greater institutional distance 
down the institutional ladder. This is consistent with Dikova (2009), who had found a positive 
association between institutional distance and subsidiary performance among Western MNCs’ 
subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast, for MNCs climbing up the 
institutional ladder, our results show that subsidiary performance weakens with increasing 
distance in this direction. Our study is the first to find this, although Gaur and Lu (2007) had 
found that greater regulative distance (regardless of direction) reduces the chances of 
subsidiary survival among Japanese firms. Our study thus argues and finds that only with 
greater distance in the upward direction, MNCs’ subsidiaries suffer from a greater negative 
imprinting effect of weak-home-institutions, while bearing costs of adapting to the host 
country institutions at the same time. Overall, we thus contribute to the paradoxical findings 
of prior studies on the institutional distance – subsidiary performance link ( Dikova, 2009; 
Gaur and Lu, 2007) by  accounting for the directionality of this distance. We also contribute 
to theories of organisational learning and unlearning (de Holan et al., 2004; Tsang and Zahra, 
2008; Zahra et al., 2011) by examining the extent to which learning and unlearning is affected 
by the direction in which MNCs invest overseas. We also contribute to imprinting 
perspectives by examining the extent to which knowledge embedded within firms affect 
subsidiary performance in MNCs overseas investments (Kriauciunas and Kale, 2006; 
Stinchcombe, 1965).       
 From a methodological perspective, we also contribute to an important gap among 
prior empirical studies related to the issue of sampling firms from a single (often developed) 
home country by providing generalizable evidence on the effects of institutional distance on 
subsidiary performance. Recent studies suggest that sampling firms from a single home 
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country creates a potential conflation between ‘institutional distance’ and ‘institutional 
profile’ effects (Van Hoorn and Maseland, 2016). Since institutional distance is calculated as 
the difference between home and host countries’ institutional profile scores (e.g. differences 
between Worldwide Governance Indicator scores), the use of a single developed home-
country makes a low institutional profile score for the host country (e.g. developing countries) 
correspond to a high institutional distance. This makes it difficult to tell whether the observed 
effects are due to weaker institutions in the host country or due to the dissimilarity of the 
institutions between the host and the home country (Van Hoorn and Maseland, 2016). It is 
therefore suggested that by including a diverse group of home and host countries, scholars can 
measure the effect of institutional distance more accurately. In our study, upon analysing the 
performance of 1936 MNC-subsidiaries over the 12-year period: 2002 – 2013, representing 
70 host countries and 66 home countries, we empirically contribute to this discussion by 
focusing on MNCs from a wider variety of home and host countries. We also use the 
Mahalanobis method that facilitates recognizing multiple, partially overlapping dimensions of 
institutions (Nebus and Chai, 2014; Yildiz, 2014). Thus overall we add robustness to the 
existing research related to institutional distance that has been limited to subsidiaries of firms 
from a specific home-country such as Japan and Poland (Gaur and Lu, 2007; Trąpczyński and 
Banalieva, 2016), particular type of MNCs such as infant multinationals (Trąpczyński and 
Banalieva, 2016),  subsidiaries in specific emerging-market regions such as Central and 
Eastern Europe (Dikova, 2009) and those operating in specific industries such as retail (Evans 
and Mavondo, 2002). 
Our study has implications for managers involved in international business. MNC 
managers have to often make decisions on new market entry by analysing the economic 
opportunities and risks of various foreign locations. In this context, while the challenges 
associated with ‘distance’ are well-known (Ghemawat, 2001), our study suggests that the 
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‘direction’ of distance also plays an important role. Our study implies that for MNCs 
establishing subsidiaries in countries with weaker regulatory institutions relative to their home 
country (downward direction), despite the challenges, distance will be relatively beneficial for 
host subsidiaries than if the MNC were to establish a subsidiary in a host country with 
relatively stronger institutions (upward direction). This is because, with downward distance, 
managers would be better able to transfer their existing capabilities from their parent to 
subsidiary levels and would spend lesser on ‘learning’ about the host market. However, when 
investing in the upward direction, they would not be able to gain these benefits, since the 
costs of learning and unlearning is higher and the potential to transfer parent capabilities 
would be lesser. This is a particularly important implication for firms from emerging 
economies investing in developed countries.  
 Despite the contributions made by our study, we understand that our study has some 
limitations that provide avenues for further research. First, we do not account for some factors 
that pose further complex effects on the relationship between institutional distance and 
subsidiary performance. In this context, host country and international experience could be an 
important variable that could moderate the effects of institutional distance in both directions 
(Delios and Beamish, 2001a; Delios and Henisz, 2003). Experience could have implications 
on  both imprinting effects and the extent to which adaptation costs would reduce, eventually 
affecting subsidiary performance (Luo and Peng, 1999; Shaver et al., 1997). However, due to 
our data limitations, we are unable to examine the complex effects of experience. Another 
limitation is that we only focus on the objective aspects of subsidiary performance i.e. the 
return on equity, and do not include subjective factors such as improvements in product 
development and managerial perceptions about critical success factors being achieved. 
However there is consensus that the objective aspects reflect the subjective aspects (Lumpkin 
and Dess, 2001). Future research could include survey-methods to combine both subjective 
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and objective aspects of subsidiary performance. Finally, while our theory presupposes that 
the mechanisms of imprinting, costs of adaptation, and mechanisms of learning and 
unlearning are the reason for the different implications of upward and downward distance on 
subsidiary performance; these mechanisms are not captured or measured in our empirical 
analysis. We suggest that future research could examine these mechanisms at a more micro 
level, probably through a qualitative approach, to provide deeper insights into how these 
mechanisms interact to explain why the performance impact is different when going down the 
institutional ladder vs. up the ladder. 
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Appendix I: List of countries used in the study 
Host Countries (70)  Home Countries (66) 
Host Country No of subsidiaries  Home Country No of parent firms 
Africa   Africa  
Egypt 42  Egypt 3 
Ghana 6  Kenya 1 
Kenya 15  Nigeria 1 
Morocco 7  South Africa 10 
Nigeria 22  Sudan 1 
South africa 29    
Tanzania 5  Americas  
Uganda 1  Argentina 4 
   Brazil 1 
Americas   Canada 49 
Argentina 11  Chile 5 
Canada 190  Costa rica 1 
Chile 12  Ecuador 1 
Costa rica 1  Mexico 5 
Ecuador 3  Panama 11 
Mexico 14  Portugal 3 
Panama 2  United states 229 
Peru 9  Uruguay 1 
Portugal 19    
United states 162  Asia  
Uruguay 2  China 34 
   Hong Kong 93 
Asia   India 18 
Bangladesh 6  Indonesia 4 
China 52  Japan 83 
Hong kong 10  Korea, republic of 12 
India 148  Malaysia 23 
Indonesia 64  Philippines 4 
Kazakhstan 12  Singapore 125 
Korea, republic of 2  Thailand 5 
Malaysia 62    
Nepal 1  Europe  
Pakistan 29  Austria 43 
Sri lanka 20  Belgium 38 
Thailand 43  Croatia 1 
   Czech Republic 6 
Europe   Denmark 18 
Austria 14  Estonia 1 
Belgium 35  Finland 9 
Bulgaria 8  France 65 
Croatia 7  Germany 77 
Czech Republic 8  Greece 2 
Denmark 11  Hungary 1 
Estonia 9  Iceland 1 
Finland 13  Ireland 19 
France 78  Italy 23 
Germany 86  Latvia 2 
Greece 22  Luxembourg 111 
Hungary 11  Malta 7 
Ireland 10  Netherlands 177 
Journal of International Management (Accepted Version)       Konara, P. & Shirodkar, V. (2018) 
 
35 
 
Notes: Countries were classified into regions based on the classification of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)’s 
World Factbook 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Italy 24  Norway 9 
Latvia 5  Poland 8 
Lithuania 7  Romania 2 
Luxembourg 15  Russian federation 9 
Malta 2  Spain 43 
Norway 13  Sweden 39 
Poland 45  Switzerland 62 
Romania 6  Turkey 2 
Russia 33  United Kingdom 168 
Slovakia 6    
Slovenia 3  Middle-East  
Spain 10  Bahrain 5 
Sweden 18  Israel 13 
Switzerland 20  Kuwait 14 
Turkey 35  Lebanon 2 
Ukraine 1  Oman 4 
United Kingdom 169  Qatar 5 
   Saudi Arabia 25 
Middle-East   Syrian Arab republic 1 
Bahrain 2  United Arab Emirates 32 
Israel 30    
Jordan 28  Oceania  
Kuwait 2  Australia 19 
Oman 17  New Zealand 10 
Saudi Arabia 2  Samoa 1 
   Vanuatu 1 
Oceania     
Australia 120    
New Zealand 9    
Papua New Guinea 1    
     
Total 1,936  Total 1,802 
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Appendix II: Variable description, measurement, and sources 
Variable Description/Measurement Data Source 
ROE Return on Equity 
Bureau van Dijk’s OSIRIS 
database 
Size Log value of firm’s total assets 
Age Firm age 
No of Directors Number of directors  
Full ownership 
A binary variable which takes the value of one if the firm is 
a wholly owned subsidiary and zero if the firm is partially 
owned with at least a 10% stake. 
R&D intensity RND intensity (RND expenditure as a proportion of sales)  
Diversified 
A dummy variable which takes the value of one if the firm 
has more than one industry (defined at the 2-digit level of 
NACE rev 2 classification) and zero if only one industry. 
Competition 
Total number of firms (both local and foreign) in the 
industry (defined at the 2-digit level of NACE rev 2 
classification)  
Patents No of patents registered by the firm in the last 3 years 
Bureau van Dijk’s ORBIS 
database Parent patents 
No of patents registered by the parent firm in the last 3 
years 
ID 
Composite measure of institutional distance on worldwide 
governance indicators (based on factor analysis) 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators 
AID Absolute value of ID 
MID 
Composite measure of institutional distance on worldwide 
governance indicators (based on mahalonobis method) 
Downward institutional 
distance (IDd) Directional vectors of the institutional distance as 
constructed in the methodology Upward institutional 
distance (IDu) 
GDP growth GDP growth rate of the host country 
World Development Indicators 
GDP per capita GDP per capita of the host country 
Infrastructure Mobile connections per 100 people in the host country 
Human capital Secondary School enrolment (% gross) of the host country  
Business Freedom 
Business Freedom dimension from Heritage Foundation 
Economic Freedom Index 
Heritage Foundation Economic 
Freedom Index 
(http://www.heritage.org/index/) 
Geographical distance 
Geographical distance between the home and the host 
country 
(Rose and Spiegel, 2011) 
Language distance 
5 point scale based on the incidence (p) of home country’s 
dominant language(s) in host country. 
5 = p < 1%; 4 = 1%  < p < 5%; 3 = 5%  < p < 50%;  
2 = 50%  < p < 90%; 1 = p > 90% 
Dow and Karunaratna (2006) 
Religious distance 
5 point scale based on the incidence (p) of home country's 
dominant religion(s) in host country 
5 = p < 1%; 4 = 1%  < p < 5%; 3 = 5%  < p < 50%;  
2 = 50%  < p < 90%; 1 = p > 90% 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix  
 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Correlation coefficients 
     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1 Return on Equity -12.01 605.27 -41205.1 28963.33 
                      
2 AID 1.08 0.89 0 4.67 0.02 
                     
3 MID 2.64 1.16 0.33 6.56 0.02 0.66 
                    
4 FID 0.33 1.36 -4.67 3.61 0.02 0.19 0.37 
                   
5 IDd 0.71 0.88 0 3.61 0.03 0.65 0.62 0.87 
                  
6 IDu 0.37 0.74 0 4.67 -0.01 0.43 0.06 -0.8 -0.4 
                 
7 Size 11.93 2.03 -2.12 20.23 0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 
                
8 Age 31.01 31.67 0 341 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.08 0.08 -0.05 0.21 
               
9 Full ownership 0.23 0.42 0 1 0 -0.15 -0.15 -0.17 -0.21 0.06 -0.03 -0.07 
              
10 R&D intensity 0.24 5.26 0 426.16 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0 -0.03 -0.03 0 
             
11 Subsidiary Patents 0.17 0.7 0 6.18 0 -0.08 -0.11 -0.07 -0.1 0.02 0.12 -0.02 0.03 0.03 
            
12 No of Directors 0.47 1.54 0 9.55 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.1 0.11 -0.06 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0 0.11 
           
13 Diversified 17.39 16.31 0 354 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.37 0.1 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0 
          
14 Parent Patents 0.29 0.45 0 1 0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.07 0 0 
         
15 Competition 3.4 1.87 0 7.3 -0.02 -0.09 -0.07 -0.16 -0.17 0.09 -0.13 -0.17 0.03 0.05 0.15 0.07 -0.13 0.09 
        
16 GDP growth 3.56 3.62 -17.95 33.74 0.02 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.47 -0.15 -0.12 -0.02 -0.11 -0.02 -0.07 0.09 -0.1 -0.04 0 
       
17 GDP per capita 22081.28 17744.11 306.03 87716.73 -0.03 -0.49 -0.56 -0.66 -0.76 0.31 0.09 -0.06 0.23 0.05 0.16 -0.13 0.05 0.1 0.28 -0.52 
      
18 Human capital 91.75 22.73 21.78 159.15 -0.02 -0.45 -0.47 -0.57 -0.67 0.25 0.09 -0.05 0.21 0.01 0.07 -0.17 0.07 0.08 0.06 -0.45 0.67 
     
19 Infrastructure 82.74 36.59 0.33 229.24 0 -0.26 -0.32 -0.39 -0.43 0.2 0.25 0.01 0.12 -0.01 0.07 -0.08 0.16 0 -0.19 -0.42 0.45 0.55 
    
20 Business Freedom 74.61 15.69 36.3 100 -0.03 -0.43 -0.52 -0.64 -0.71 0.33 0.08 -0.08 0.18 0.04 0.13 -0.13 0.03 0.08 0.16 -0.57 0.79 0.61 0.47 
   
21 Geographical distance 2985.45 2577.71 62.36 12003.92 -0.02 0.19 0.1 -0.02 0.08 0.13 -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.13 -0.06 0.01 0.26 0.11 -0.06 -0.06 -0.22 0 
  
22 Religious distance 2.73 1.24 1 5 0.03 0.41 0.53 0.27 0.42 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 -0.11 -0.02 -0.02 0.16 -0.03 -0.02 0.17 0.32 -0.41 -0.36 -0.3 -0.38 0.25 
 
23 Language distance 2.02 1.3 1 5 -0.01 -0.2 -0.23 -0.17 -0.23 0.04 -0.13 -0.04 0.02 0.03 0 -0.12 -0.09 0 0.13 -0.03 0.12 0.12 -0.05 0.18 0.05 -0.25 
Notes: 1. The number of observations for all variables is 11922 
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Table 2: Estimations with composite institutional distance variables 
 
 (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) 
AID -0.219   
 (11.18)   
MID  2.544  
  (7.769)  
ID   77.72** 
   (34.51) 
Size 14.10*** 14.09*** 14.27*** 
 (2.760) (2.777) (2.800) 
Age 0.0914 0.0919 0.0886 
 (0.156) (0.159) (0.159) 
Full ownership -3.898 -3.772 -3.914 
 (17.75) (17.72) (17.71) 
R&D intensity -1.016 -1.013 -1.013 
 (0.961) (0.961) (0.965) 
Subsidiary Patents -4.797 -4.752 -5.326 
 (3.901) (3.901) (3.890) 
No of Directors 1.624 1.636 1.176 
 (1.935) (1.932) (1.900) 
Diversified -0.524** -0.526** -0.531** 
 (0.252) (0.250) (0.253) 
Parent Patents 14.75 14.73 15.02 
 (9.637) (9.795) (9.781) 
Competition -7.703 -7.665 -7.702 
 (8.149) (8.209) (8.179) 
GDP growth 0.249 0.267 0.680 
 (1.640) (1.648) (1.625) 
GDP per capita -0.00518 -0.00526 -0.00451 
 (0.00920) (0.00910) (0.00907) 
Human capital 1.579 1.577 1.598 
 (1.230) (1.222) (1.226) 
Infrastructure 1.313 1.312 1.281 
 (0.848) (0.849) (0.839) 
Business Freedom 2.595* 2.607* 2.639* 
 (1.454) (1.459) (1.466) 
Geographical distance -0.00616 -0.00619 -0.00630 
 (0.00395) (0.00388) (0.00391) 
Religious distance 26.45** 25.87* 26.69** 
 (13.19) (13.23) (12.81) 
Language distance 4.007 4.518 3.989 
 (5.712) (5.867) (5.556) 
Constant -566.4*** -583.5*** -495.1*** 
 (168.4) (194.3) (169.0) 
N 11,922 11,922 11,922 
Firms 1,936 1,936 1,936 
R2 0.0261 0.0261 0.0264 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  
1. Country-specific, year specific and industry specific fixed effects are included but not reported for brevity.  
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Table 3: Estimations with directional institutional distance variables 
 
 (3.1) (3.2) 
Downward institutional distance (IDd) 76.53**  
 (34.04)  
Upward institutional distance (IDu) -79.54**  
 (39.39)  
Full ownership * Downward institutional distance  85.63** 
  (40.28) 
Partial ownership * Downward institutional distance  75.07** 
  (33.49) 
Full ownership * Upward institutional distance  -89.00** 
  (38.28) 
Partial ownership * Upward institutional distance  -74.55* 
  (40.86) 
Size 14.28*** 14.31*** 
 (2.785) (2.774) 
Age 0.0893 0.0889 
 (0.156) (0.157) 
Full ownership -3.924 -2.130 
 (17.76) (28.30) 
R&D intensity -1.013 -1.016 
 (0.965) (0.966) 
Subsidiary Patents -5.335 -5.523 
 (3.890) (3.881) 
No of Directors -0.530** -0.521** 
 (0.254) (0.251) 
Diversified 15.08 14.64 
 (9.614) (9.663) 
Parent Patents 1.177 1.310 
 (1.900) (1.911) 
Competition -7.679 -7.646 
 (8.147) (8.141) 
GDP growth 0.681 0.659 
 (1.626) (1.620) 
GDP per capita -0.00450 -0.00452 
 (0.00909) (0.00911) 
Human capital 1.599 1.633 
 (1.234) (1.229) 
Infrastructure 1.282 1.285 
 (0.839) (0.842) 
Business Freedom 2.638* 2.635* 
 (1.464) (1.441) 
Geographical distance -0.00625 -0.00644 
 (0.00396) (0.00403) 
Religious distance 26.99** 27.53** 
 (13.29) (13.32) 
Language distance 3.914 4.109 
 (5.730) (5.825) 
Constant -489.6*** -505.3*** 
 (154.3) (150.3) 
N 11,922 11,922 
Firms 1,936 1,936 
R2 0.0264 0.0265 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  
1. Country-specific, year specific and industry specific fixed effects are included but not reported for brevity.  
